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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized "hostile environment" sexual
harassment as a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 The
hostile environment cause of action has generated decisions in which lower
courts have adopted a novel "reasonable woman" standard for evaluating such
claims. 2 The adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard is noteworthy not
only because it signals a departure from the traditional "reasonable person"
standard, but because it flows from an express interpretation of the purpose of
Title VII, and because it represents an implicit incorporation of principles of
pluralism into the formulation of a judicial standard.
The adoption of the reasonable woman standard is open to criticism on
several fronts: that courts adopting the reasonable woman standard incorrectly
interpret the purpose of Title VII; that victim-specific pluralistic principles
which underlie the reasonable woman standard destructively fragment the
judicial decisionmaking process; and even that the reasonable woman standard
is, although more pluralistic than the reasonable person standard, still
inadequate to address the needs of victims, and fails to truly represent and
validate the multitude of perspectives among women or victims.
In this Note, I will examine the rationale behind the adoption of the
reasonable woman standard and address the criticisms listed above. In Part II of
this Note, I will examine the history of the hostile environment cause of action.
In Part III, I will discuss the language of the Meritor decision and the possible
applications that the opinion invites. In Part IV, I will examine lower courts'
applications of Meritor. I will analyze the majority and dissenting opinions in
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.3 as examples of the principled bases of the
different applications of Meritor, and look at other decisions applying standards
similar to those adopted in Rabidue. I will also consider Ellison v. Brady,4 in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the
reasonable woman standard based on the rationale articulated in the Rabidue
dissent. In Part V, I will address criticism of the reasonable woman standard
and suggest that the adoption of the standard flows from a credible construction
I Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
3 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
4 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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of Title VII, and that the pluralism implicit in the standard is a necessary
reflection of shared understandings about our political and judicial
decisionmaking systems. In Part VI, I will conclude that the reasonable woman
standard, although imperfect, takes a step in the direction of meaningful "equal
protection" under the law, and allows for further adjustment and improvement
as courts continue to decide hostile environment cases.
II. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part that "[it
is] an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of an indivudual's... sex ... ."s Two
causes of action for sexual harassment have been recognized by the courts:
"quid pro quo" harassment claims and "hostile work environment" claims. 6 In
a quid pro quo cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the employer has
explicitly conditioned an employment benefit on the employee's sexual
acquiescence, or has threatened a detriment if the employee refuses to
acquiesce.7 In a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff alleges that continued
subjection to sexually offensive treatment in the workplace has become an
implicit condition of employment.8
III. MERJTOR SAVINGS BANK, FSB V. VINSON
The United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
held that hostile environment sexual harassment constitutes illegal sex
discrimination under Title VII. 9 In so holding, the Court acknowledged the
validity of several lower court decisions which had recognized hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. 10 Because Title VII itself provides no
guidelines for deciding hostile environment sexual harassment claims, the
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
6 See generally Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875; ARTHUR LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DIsCRIMINATION § 41.61 (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OFWORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979).
7 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
81Id.
9 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
10 Id.; see also Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Supreme Court in Meritor looked to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC") 1980 Guidelines, which provide in part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of See. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when... (3)
such conduct has the purpose and effect of unreasonably interfering with an
indivudual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a
particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.11
A. Different Readings Are Possible Under Meritor
The Supreme Court in Meritor provided no definitive standard for
evaluating hostile environment claims, and in acknowledging lower court
decisions in analogous cases, invited at least two significantly different
characterizations of what constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment.
These characterizations implicitly communicate two starkly different notions of
the purpose of Title VII, and have the potential to yield very different results in
otherwise identical cases. Lower courts looking to Meritor have struggled in
determining what constitutes a "hostile environment" and have come to
different conclusions as to what standard is appropriate for deciding such cases.
B. Sources of Courts' Differing Readings of Meritor
The Supreme Court in Meritor approved of the EEOC Guidelines outlining
a hostile environment cause of action, and also included quotations from two
lower court decisions, Rogers v. EEOC,12 and Henson v. Dundee,13 which
recognized, respectively, race-based and gender-based hostile environment
harassment. In approving of the EEOC Guidelines, the Supreme Court stated,
"[i]n concluding that so-called 'hostile environment' (i.e., non quid pro quo)
harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of
judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords employees
11 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(g) (1980).12 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
13 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
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the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult."1 4 Section 1604.11(a) of the EEOC Guidelines
(reproduced above) provides generally that "[h]arassment on the basis of sex"
is a violation of Title VII, and then states that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature constitute harassment" if they unreasonably interfere with an indivual's
work performance, or if they create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment." 15 The quotations taken from Rogers and Henson resemble this
EEOC Guideline. Each begins with an acknowledgment of hostile environment
sexual harassment as a cause of action, then follows with an example (italicized
in the following quotations) of a situation which would constitute such
harassment. The portion of the Rogers opinion quoted in Meritor stated:
[The] phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in [Title VII] is
an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of
creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.... One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers .... 16
The portion of the Henson opinion quoted in Meritor stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege
of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 17
The Court in Meritor also cited to another passage from Henson which stated
that for sexual harassment to be actionable, "it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment." 18
As the Court provided no concrete guidelines for determining what
standards to apply in determining whether a workplace was a hostile
environment, lower courts have frequently looked to passages from the EEOC
14 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
15 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
16 Metitor, 477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238) (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902) (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
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Guidelines and from Rogers and Henson to guide them in their decisionmaking.
Some courts have focused on the language in the EEOC Guidelines which
states that individuals are entitled to a workplace "free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult," and have measured alleged harassing
behavior in relation to a workplace "free from" such harassment. 19 By
measuring allegedly hostile environments in relation to a harassment-free
environment, such courts have, either implicitly or explicitly, read the passages
from the EEOC Guidelines and from Rogers and Henson as illustrative of
hostile environments, but not as defining environments presenting an actionable
claim. One court explicitly read section 1604.11(a) of the EEOC Guidelines as
providing first a general acknowledgement of sexual harassment as a cause of
action under Title VII, and second, an illustration of actionable harassment, but
not an exclusive definition of actionable conduct. 20
We read the first sentence, that harassment based on sex is a violation of Title
VII, to be the general concept, and the second sentence as merely an
illustration of how explicit sexual conduct could rise to this level. But, if the
second sentence were to modify the first, it would seem to imply that only
explicit sexual harassment would be actionable. This reading does not appear
to be consistent with either the wording of the EEOC Guidelines or the
prevailing case law.21
These courts read the quoted passages as providing examples of conduct or
environments which constitute hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title VII, but they do not treat the EEOC Guidelines description of harassing
behavior, nor the Rogers and Henson descriptions, as threshold levels
necessary to state a cause of action.22 Courts reading the Merltor decision in
this way have been more likely to adopt the reasonable woman or reasonable
victim standard.
Other courts have measured allegedly hostile environments against the level
of sexually harassing conduct present, and therefore reasonably expected, in
society at large or in a particular sort of workplace. 23 These courts have read
the "free from" EEOC language as guaranteeing a work environment free from
19 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991).
20 See Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990).
21 Id. at 1485 n.6.
22 See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485 n.6; Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
23 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Caleshu
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Vermett
v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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a level of sexually harassing conduct beyond the level a reasonable person
would expect, given contemporary societal and workplace attitudes. Such
courts have tended to treat the Rogers quotation, which refers to "working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers," as
defining the threshold for a hostile environment cause of action, often seeling
evidence of the victim's psychological debilitation as they evaluate a claim. 24
These courts have decided cases by using the purportedly gender-neutral
"reasonable person" standard, and have rejected a reasonable woman or
reasonable victim standard.25
The courts measuring harassment in relation to a harassment-free
workplace and adopting a victim-specific standard such as the reasonable
woman standard either expressly or implicitly adopt a broad construction of the
purpose of Title VII. These courts construe Title VII as a mechanism for
effecting change in workplace conduct at a pace that is faster than change is
occurring in society generally. These courts, by adopting a victim-specific
standard, incorporate a pluralistic element into their jurisprudence.
Courts measuring harassment against existing societal or workplace norms
construe Title VII's purpose more narrowly, arguing that the statute should not
and cannot create workplace standards for non-harassment which are more
stringent than societal norms. These courts implicitly reject pluralism in
formulating a standard.
I will argue that the latter reading of Meritor cannot be justified by the
language of the opinion nor by the decisions the Supreme Court acknowledges
in the opinion. Furthermore, I will suggest that the principles implicit in this
reading of Meritor actually undercut the effectiveness of Title VII and are
inconsistent with, and unacceptable within, a diverse, pluralistic democracy. I
will suggest instead that the broader construction of Title VII's purpose is
consistent with the basic notion of remedial legislation such as Title VII, and
that a reasonable woman or reasonable victim standard is necessary to further
this purpose. The reasonable woman standard also indicates an adjustment that
makes the legal/judicial system more responsive to the needs of a pluralistic
society. 26
24 See Scott, 798 F.2d at 213; Caleshu, 737 F. Supp. at 1081-82.
25 Scott, 798 F.2d at 213; Caleshu, 737 F. Supp. at 1081-82.
26 In analyzing courts' application of Meitor, I will be focusing on cases
representative of the rationale rather than providing an exhaustive treatment of all hostile
environment cases decided since Meitor.
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IV. LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF MERITOR
Some appellate courts have avoided deciding what standard to apply to
hostile environment cases by relying on a "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, and have either affirmed or reversed lower court holdings on that
ground alone.27 Courts directly addressing the issue of what standard to apply
under Meritor tend to either adopt a narrow construction of Title VII and apply
the reasonable person standard, 28 or a broader construction of Title VII and
apply a reasonable woman or reasonable victim standard.29
A. itle VII Narrowly Construed: The Argwnent For the Reasonable
Person Standard
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,30 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that although a male
employee's language and office poster displays constituted "verbal conduct of a
sexual nature" within the meaning of the EEOC's guidelines on sexual
harassment, the language and posters did not create "an environment of
harassment necessary to support a charge of sexual harassment." 31
The trial court record indicated that the plaintiff Vivien Rabidue's alleged
sexual harassment arose primarily as a result of her "unfortunate acrimonious
working relationship" with another employee, Douglas Henry.32 The record
stated that Mr. Henry was "an extremely vulgar and crude individual who
customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and, on
occasion, directed such obscenities at the plaintiff." 33 Management knew of
Henry's vulgarity, but informal discussions with him on the subject had been
"unsuccessful at curbing his offensive personality traits." 34 The dissent in
2 7 See, e.g., Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1989).
28 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); see also
Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Eperience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 H-Iv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 60 (1990) (arguing that Meritor opted for a strict standard).
29 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
30 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see also Jordan v.
Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jordan v. Hodel, 488
U.S. 1006 (1989).
31 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 614.
32 Id. at 615.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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Rabidue included a more graphic description of the work environment
evaluated by the trial court, noting the following facts:
One poster, which remained on the wall for eight years, showed a prone
woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf
club in hand, yelling "Fore." ... Henry routinely referred to women as
"whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits." Of plaintiff, Henry specifically
remarked "All that bitch needs is a good lay" and called her "fat ass." 35
After reviewing the EEOC Guidelines and legal precedent, the majority
concluded that to prevail in a Title VII hostile work environment action, the
plaintiff must assert and prove that "the charged sexual harassment had the
effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work performance and
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that
affected seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff." 36 The
majority's requirement that to be actionable the harassment must "seriously
affect the psychological well-being of the plaintiff" does not appear in either the
EEOC Guidelines or the Supreme Court's opinion in Meritor. Apparently, the
majority incorporates this requirement based on the Rogers quotation in the
Mefitor opinion acknowledging the possibility of work environments "so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers." 37 The Court in Meritor
made no indication that the description was intended as a standard for
actionability. 38
35 Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
36 Id. at 619. Additional elements of a colorable claim not directly related to this
discussion include: (1) that the employee be the member of a protected class; (2) that the
employee be subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that
the harassment complained of be based upon sex; and (4) that the employee prove the
existence of respondeat superior liability. See Elison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citing Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
Jordan v. Hadel, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989)).
37 In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit postulated that the Rabidue court had taken its
requirement of psychological debilitation from the quotation of Rogers in Meritor. Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 888 n.8 (9th Cir. 1991).
38 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971)). To treat the conditions described in the Rogers opinion as a threshold for a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim is arguably to take the quotation out of the context of
both the Meritor opinion and the original Rogers case, in which the Fifth Circuit applied no
such requirement of "psychological debilitation." In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit allowed
discovery regarding the plaintiff's charge that as a minority employee in a nursing care
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The Rabidue majority then applied a "reasonable person" standard
combined with a requirement that the plaintiff show "actual harm" as a result
of the alleged harassment. 39 The court stated that "to accord appropriate
protection to both plaintiffs and defendants," the trier of fact, taking into
consideration the totality of the circumstances, "must adopt the perspective of a
reasonable person" subjected to "a similar environment under essentially like
or similar circumstances." 40 The court explained that:
[In the absence of conduct which would interfere with that hypothetical
reasonable individual's work performance and affect seriously the
psychological well-being of that reasonable person under like circumstances, a
plaintiff may not prevail on asserted charges of sexual harassment anchored in
an alleged hostile and/or abusive work environment regardless of whether the
plaintiff was actually offended by the defendant's conduct. 41
The court then held that under this standard the plaintiff had failed to show that
the alleged harassing behavior and poster displays would be offensive to a
reasonable person subjected to the same circumstances, and therefore could not
prevail on the hostile environment claim. 42 The court reasoned:
In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that Henry's obscenities,
although annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the
psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees. The evidence did not
demonstrate that this single employee's vulgarity substantially affected the
totality of the workplace. 43
The majority opinion also stated that a "proper assessment or evaluation" of an
allegedly hostile environment required consideration of various factors, both
subjective and objective, such as:
the nature of the alleged harassment, the background and experience of the
plaintiff, her co-workers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical
environment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded
the environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's
facility, she was subjected to a hostile environment when the employer segregated minority
patients in the facility. There was no mention in Rogers of a requirement that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the alleged harassment had a severe psychological impact. Rogers, 454
F.2d at 241.
39 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 1d. at 622.
43 Id.
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introduction to its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the
plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment. 44
The Rabidue majority explicitly rejects the notion that the purpose of Title
VII is to provide a workplace "free from" the harassment that exists at a
significant level in society at large, and quotes with approval the district
courts's opinion stating:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor
and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations
and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-nor can [it]-
change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female
workers of America. But it is quite different to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers. 45
The majority's rationale and resulting "reasonable person" standard, with
consideration of a multitude of additional factors, flow from the assumption
that Title VII's purpose is not to eliminate sexual harassment entirely from the
workplace, but rather to ensure that levels of sexual harassment in the
workplace do not exceed levels in society generally. Indeed, the majority
opinion suggests that an individual assumes the risk of a level of sexually
charged conduct upon "voluntarily entering" certain work environments which
have a pre-established level of offensive behavior. Under such circumstances,
the individual offended by the conduct has no colorable complaint unless the
level of harassment exceeds that which a reasonable individual would expect in
such a setting. 46
44 Id. at 620.
45 Id. at 620-21.
46 Id. The majority's "assumption of the risk" argument would be more applicable to
workplace harassment if employees entered the working world absent any complusion, and
could therefore leave upon encountering undesirable conditions. Similarly, even if
compelled to work, an employee might be said to "assume the risk" of a hostile work
environment if other comparable work at comparable pay were readily available, and the
harassed employee could easily move to another job. However, the overwhelming majority
of employees, women and men, do not experience employement as an optional activity, nor
can they easily move from one job to another with no adverse effects. Women in particular
have less latitude in the employment market, because fewer well-paying jobs are available
to women, because women earn only about 70% of what men earn for full-time
employment, and because a woman is just as likely to be supporting a family with children
as a man. See generally FRANCImE D. BLAU AND MARIANNE A. FERISFR, THE ECONOMICS
OFWOMEN, MEN AND WORK (1986).
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By using a "reasonable person" standard and considering "social mores"
of sexually offensive behavior, the Rabidue majority implicitly does two things:
it aligns Title VII protection with societal attitudes, and it endorses the notion
that there exists an "acceptable" level of harassing behavior in each workplace.
The majority states that the events complained of by the plaintiff, although
"annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the
plaintiff or other female employees." 47 By characterizing theatmosphere
described in the trial court record as "annoying," the majority suggests that
such an atmosphere must be expected and tolerated by female employees. In a
footnote, the majority further emphasizes its conclusion that the incidents and
displays complained of were trivial by comparing them to facts of other cases
in which hostile environment sexual harassment was found.48 In those cases the
plaintiffs were subjected to "continual personal and telephonic sexual
propositions both at work and at ... home" and "numerous harangues and
demeaning inquiries... vulgarities, and repeated requests for sexual relations"
from supervisors. 49 By contrast, the Rabidue case "involved no sexual
propositions, offensive touchings, or sexual conduct of a similar nature that
was systematically directed to the plaintiff over a protracted period of time." 50
It seems the majority is comparing the plaintiff's allegations to "norms" of
sexually hostile environments, and is in essence saying that to be severely
affected by the environment in Rabidue (trivial in comparison to other work
environments to which women have been subjected) is "unreasonable,"
therefore no hostile environment sexual harassment is present. Again, this is a
comparison to an existing "norm" which is allowed to continue to determine
the working conditions, expectations, and remedies of women in the
workplace.
Other courts signing onto the Rabidue standard have even more clearly
endorsed the idea that a certain type and level of harassment may be reasonably
expected and is thus acceptable. For example, in Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch,
As the dissent points out, the majority's suggestion that a woman employee in some
way assumes the risk of working in an abusive, anti-female environment constitutes a
contention that "such work environments somehow have an innate right to perpetuation and
are not to be addressed by Title VII." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). The dissent explicitly states that "the hostile environment standard
set forth in the majority opinion shields and condones behavior Title VII would have the
court redress." Id. at 628.
47 Id. at 622.
48 Id. at 622 n.7.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith5' the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri considered a case in which a secretary/sales assistant alleged that her
supervisor, shortly after he was hired, began inviting her to lunch and asking to
date her socially.52 The plaintiff complained of two incidents in which her
supervisor forcibly french kissed her, and two incidents where he touched
plaintiff's thigh without her consent.53 Additionally, he appeared at a private
dinner she was attending despite her objection, and showed up at a bar when
plaintiff was there.54 Another female employee testified that the same
supervisor placed his hand on her knee without her consent on one occasion,
and attempted to kiss her between five and ten times. 55 Another female
employee testified that although that same supervisor never asked her out, nor
attempted to touch her, she found him offensive. 56 In light of this testimony,
the court applied the reasonable person standard and sought evidence of
psychological debilitation, and found that the actions did not rise to the level of
hostile environment sexual harassment, stating:
Adopting the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar
environment under essentially like or similar circumstances, the Court finds
that the total effect of Borgognoni's actions throughout the five months was not
such that it could have interfered with a reasonable person's work performance
or seriously affected the psychological well-being of that reasonable person. In
fact, the Court finds that most of the actions complained of were trivial, such
as asking plaintiff to the Mutual Funds dinner, giving plaintiff a gift and card,
and showing up at the "Exchange" bar, and telling the jokes.5 7
In Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza,58 the District Court for Colorado
considered a case in which a female restaurant employee complained of
offensive language and unwelcome touching in the workplace. The court found
no hostile environment sexual harassment, stating:
The specific instances of use of foul language and alleged unwelcome touching
reported by the witnesses were actually sparse. For example, Carla Ebert
51 Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo.
1990).
52 Id. at 1076.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1077.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1082-83.
58 715 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Colo. 1987).
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testified that she was touched two times in what she felt was an abusive
manner, although her tenure at LTP ran from May of 1984 until August of
1985. 59
Apparently, this court finds that during a period of fifteen months, two
incidents of unwelcome touching were reasonable and legally acceptable.
Perhaps one of the more startling applications of Mentor in line with the
Rabidue majority is by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co.60 In Scott, a female auto mechanic
trainee asserted that she was repeatedly harassed by her immediate supervisor,
who, she alleged, repeatedly propositioned her, winked at her, and suggested
that he give her a "rubdown." 61 The trial court also found that when the
plaintiff asked the supervisor for advice or assistance, he would often reply,
"what will I get for it?" 62 The plaintiff also alleged that another employee
"slapped her on the buttocks and that another mechanic once told her that he
knew that she must moan and groan while having sex." 63 The appellate court
agreed with the district court's holding that no hostile environment sexual
harassment was present, stating that:
the harassment plaintiff was subjected to (even as advanced by plaintiff) was
not so severe, debilitating, or pervasive that it created an actionable hostile
environment claim within the current interpretation of Title VII. Assuming all
the conduct Scott complains of is true, her claim still falls short of what is
necessary to maintain an action.64
Among the facts additionally considered by the district court were the
following: that the supervisor never explicitly asked the plaintiff to have sex,
that the supervisor never touched the plaintiff, and that despite the supervisor's
"what will I get for it" responses, he never actually withheld advice upon her
refisal to "give something" in return. 65 The appellate court looked for
evidence of psychological debilitation as a requirement for a hostile
environment cause of action, and finding none, also found the plaintiff had no
cause of action. The court wrote:
59 Id. at 1499.
60 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
61 Id. at 211.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 213-14.
65 Id. at 212.
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Scott complains of being offensively propositioned, yet the only concrete
example she raises is Eddie Gadberry's request that she join him at a mall
restaurant after work. As for Gadberry's winks and suggestions he be allowed
to give her a rubdown, there is no evidence whatsoever these "hints" were so
pervasive or psychologically debilitating that they affected Scott's ability to
perform on the job. Furthermore, the comments and conduct of the other
mechanics is too isolated and lacking the repetitive and debilitating effect
necessary to maintain a hostile environment claim. 6
6
Like the Caleshu court, the Scott court used comparisons with the facts of other
cases involving extreme examples of hostile environment sexual harassment
(forcible rape was one of the incidents of harassment in Meritor to which the
court in Scott referred), to bolster its rationale for finding the alleged
harassment in Scott insufficient to support a cause of action.67
The Scott court also supported its holding with findings that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the supervisor allegedly harassing her was
friendly, and that the supervisor did not retaliate against the plaintiff when she
did not acquiesce. The court stated:
We note, not insignificantly, that when deposed Scott admitted she considered
Gadberry her friend. Additionally, there is no evidence of Gadberry becoming
bitter due to Scott's refusal to entertain his advances. For example, there is no
evidence Gadberry, as a senior brake mechanic, ever withheld advice from
Scott or placed her in a disadvantageous position in the workplace. Indeed, the
one time Gadberry was asked to evaluate Scott's performance, his response
was favorable. 68
The Scott court's focus on the emotional or psychological state of the
harasser upon having his advances refused is unique and arguably misplaced in
an analysis designed to determine the effect of the work environment on the
victim. In addition, by taking notice that the supervisor never actually withheld
advice upon the plaintiff's refusal to respond sexually, and that the supervisor
evaluated the plaintiff's work performance favorably, the court essentially
evaluates the environment according to the elements of a quid pro quo sexual
harassment cause of action rather than according to those of a hostile
environment cause of action. 69 Because a hostile environment cause of action
66 Id. at 214.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. In a quid pro quo action, the plaintiff
alleges that the employer has explicitly conditioned an employment benefit on the
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was acknowledged explicitly to address situations in which a quid pro quo
action does not lie, but in which the plaintiff suffered detriment as a result of a
distinctive form of gender-based discrimination, the facts of an allegation of
hostile environment harassment, no matter how compelling, cannot support a
quid pro quo cause of action. Thus by applying a quid pro quo analysis to the
facts of the case at bar, the Scott court had arguably predetermined the
outcome.
B. Title VII Broadly Construed-The Argument for the Reasonable
Woman Standard
The dissent in Rabidue rejects the "reasonable person" standard adopted by
the majority, and also explicitly rejects the majority's narrow construction of
the purpose of Title VII. 70 Judge Keith asserts that by applying a "reasonable
person" standard and allowing the consideration of a multitude of other factors,
the majority allows the standard to be determined largely according to the
perspective of the harasser rather than the victim. 71 He explains that a "gender-
neutral" reasonable person standard does not reflect the perspective of a female
victim, stating that "the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the
wide divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct
and those of men."72 He further asserts that by mandating the consideration of
the "prevailing work environment," "the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the
environment both before and after plaintiff's introduction into its environs,"
and the plaintiff's reasonable expectations upon "voluntarily" entering that
environment, the majority suggests that "a woman assumes the risk of working
in an abusive, anti-female environment." 73 He states that the majority, by
applying a standard which diminishes the importance of the victim's
perspective by allowing for consideration of past and present workplace norms,
"contends that such work environments somehow have an innate right to
perpetuation and are not to be addressed under Title VII." 74
Judge Keith disagrees with this resulting perpetuation and with the
assertion that Title VII is not meant to change work environments where
"humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar" and "[s]exual jokes, sexual
employee's sexual acquiescence, or has threatened a detriment if the employee refuses to
acquiesce.
70 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 626-27.
72 Id. at 626.
73 Id.
74Id.
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conversations and girlie magazines may abound." 75 He states instead, "[i]n my
view, Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from
poisoning the work environment of classes protected under the Act." 76 Judge
Keith explicitly disagrees with the majority's consideration of the backgrounds
of the harasser or other co-workers in determining whether the victim was
subjected to hostile environment sexual harassment, stating that "the
background of the defendant or other workers is irrelevant." 77 In comparison,
he notes that "[n]o court analyzes the backround and experience of a supervisor
who refuses to promote black employees before finding actionable race
discrimination under Title VII. "78
Judge Keith also disagrees with the majority's contention that societal
tolerance of sexually offensive or degrading materials mandates workplace
toleration of the same, on the grounds that he does not believe that women
(who constitute more than half of "society") actually "condone the pervasive
degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American
culture." 79 Judge Keith asserts that the "relevant inquiry" in hostile
environment cases "is what the reasonable woman would find offensive, not
society, which at one time condoned slavery." 80
In Ellison v. Brady,81 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit broke with the majority opinions in Rabidue and Scott and instead
applied a "reasonable woman" standard, incorporating much of the rationale in
Judge Keith's Rabidue dissent into its opinion.82
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 627.
78 Id.
7 9 Id. The reaction of Congressional women to the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas sexual
harassment hearings (in which an all white, all male Senate Judiciary Committee evaluated
sexual harassment allegations against then-nominee Judge Thomas, after the FBI report on
its investigations was made public) suggests that Judge Keith was correct in his observation.
See Janet Cawley, Outcry Stalls Vote on Thomas, CHm. TRm., Oct. 19, 1991, at 1C
(reporting on a march by seven female members of the House of Representatives to a
closed-door meeting of Senate Democrats discussing the nomination in response to an
unprecedented telephone protest from constituents across the U.S.).
A year after the Thomas/Hill hearings, reports of sexual harassment had risen 44%
nationally. See Polly Basone Elliott, Outciy Among Women Linked to Hill Thomas
Heafings, CH. TRm., Oct. 28, 1992, at 4C.
80 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
81 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
82 Id. at 878-79. The court adopted a "reasonable victim" standard, and applied a
"reasonable woman" standard to the facts of the case in which the victim was a woman.
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The plaintiff in Ellison worked as a revenue agent for the Internal Revenue
Service.83 A male co-worker, Gray, assigned to the same office began asking
the plaintiff to lunch, pestering her with unnecessary questions, and hanging
around her desk. 84 When Gray wrote the plaintiff a note indicating his
disappointment at her refusals to accompany him for lunch,85 the plaintiff
became "shocked and frightened" and left the room.86 Gray followed her into
the hallway, demanding that she talk with him.87
When the plaintiff was away for four weeks of training, Gray mailed her a
card and a three-page typed letter which she described as "twenty times, a
hundred times weirder" than the earlier note. 88 The plaintiff testified that she
thought Gray was "crazy," "nuts," that she "didn't know what he would do
next," and that she was "frightened." 89 She requested that either she or Gray
be transferred because "she would not be comfortable working in the same
office with him." 90 Gray was transferred to another office, but when he was
scheduled to return to the office where the plaintiff worked, the plaintiff
immediately requested a transfer and filed formal sexual harassment charges. 91
The trial court found that there was no actionable hostile environment
harassment, characterizing Gray's conduct as "isolated and trivial." 92 The
appellate court reversed, using the trial court's charcterization of the facts of
the case as an illustration of "the importance of considering the victim's
perspective," stating that "analyzing the facts from the alleged harasser's
viewpoint, Gray could be portrayed as a modem-day Cyrano de Bergerac," but
that the victim "did not consider the acts to be trivial." 93 Instead, the plaintiff
was "shocked and frightened." 94
The Ellison court based its focus on the victim's perspective both on a
broad construction of the purpose of Title VII, and on its endorsement of
83 Id. at 873.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 874. The note read, "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today.
I have never been in such constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not
stand to feel your hatred for another day."
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id at 880.
93 Id.
94 Id. Unlike the court that decided Scott, the Ellison court did not find that the
harasser's lack of ill will toward the plaintiff cut against an actionable claim.
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pluralistic principles. The Ellison court asserted that a reasonable woman
standard was necessary to minimize the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level
of sexual harassment, a level which the "reasonable person" standard allows.
The Ellison court rejected the Rabidue majority opinion's argument that
societal norms should determine the level of workplace harassment that is
actionable under Title VII. 95 The court in Ellison stated that "Congress did not
enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary,
'Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a
sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment
opportunities for women.'" 96
The other principle driving the Ellison decision is pluralism, which
acknowledges the existence and validity of multiple perspectives within a
political community.97 The Ellison court acknowledges this principle by stating
simply that "conduct that many men find unobjectionable may offend many
women." 98 The court supports this statement with citations to sociological99
and governmental data'00 indicating that "[m]any women share common
concerns" regarding sexual harassment which men do not necessarily share. 101
Citing to Justice Department statistics,the Ellison court observed that "because
women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a
stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior." 10 2 Conversely, the
court noted that "men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or
the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive." 10 3
To accomodate for the normative difference between the perspectives of
men and women on sexual harassment, the Ellison court adopted the reasonable
95 Id. at 878, 880-81.
96 Id. at 881 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir.
1990)).
97 See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-22 (2d ed. 1988).
For general discussions of pluralistic democracy, see BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY (1984); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AD EQUALITY (1983).
98 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 888 (9th Cir. 1991).
99 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrinination and the Transfomadon of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989).
100 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFIUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1988, 299 (1989) (table 3.19).
101 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
102 Id.103 Id.
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woman standard. 10 4 The court justified its adoption of the reasonable woman
standard by explaining that "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be
male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women." 10 5
The court explicitly denied that applying a reasonable woman standard
establishes a "higher level of protection" for women than men, stating that
instead, "a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women
to particpate on an equal footing with men." 106 The court asserted that the
"reasonableness" component of the reasonable woman standard protects
defendants from "having to accomodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare
hyper-sensitive employee,"' 0 7 but also allows for adjustment of the standard as
society becomes more sensitized to these issues.' 08
V. CRITICIsM OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
The Ninth Circuit's rationale in Ellison is representative of that of courts
adopting a reasonable woman standard. 10 9 As suggested previously, the
adoption of a victim-specific standard requires that a court endorse a broad
construction of the purpose of Title VII, 110 and that it accept pluralistic
principles."' In evaluating the soundness of the reasonable woman standard,
one must begin with an examination of the soundness of these underlying
principles.
A. Title VII Broadly Construed
The Rabidue majority opinion articulates the primary criticism of the broad
construction of Title VII's purpose when it quotes with approval the district
court's statement that although Title VII is the "federal court mainstay" for
equal opportunity for women employees, "it is different to claim that Title VII
104 Id. Because the plaintiff in the case at bar was a woman, a reasonable woman
standard was appropriate. The court pointed out that in a case in which the plaintiff was
male, the appropriate standard for evaluating the hostile environment would be a
"reasonable man" standard. Id. at 879 n.11.
105 Id. at 879.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at n.12.
109 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying a
reasonable victim standard).
110 See supra notes 20-26, 70-78 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers."112 This statement suggests that a conception of Title VII
as an mechanism for hastening change would be both unrealistic and somehow
improper, although neither the district not appellate majority opinions explains
why this is so.
The narrow constructions of Title VII's purpose advanced by the Rabidue
and Scott majorities arguably leave the statute with very little to do. The dissent
in Rabidue and the majority in Ellison effectively counter the argument for
narrow construction by arguing that a narrow construction of Title VII would
perpetuate rather than discourage and ultimately eliminate workplace
harassment.1 13 Title VII, functioning as the Rabidue majority would have it
function, cannot effect a change in workplace norms that is out of step with
societal norms. What the statute can do under a narrow construction is ensure
that workplace norms do not lag behind societal norms. This seems an unlikely
aspiration for "remedial" legislation such as Title VII, which grew out of an
acknowledgment that various forms of discrimination in society are both
pervasive and unacceptable. 114
B. Dangers Inherent in a Pluralistic Standard
Any standard incorporating pluralistic principles is open to criticism from
two directions. Pluralism is the idea that cultural diversity is a positive good,
deserving of legal and political protection, which ultimately enhances
democratic society. 115 Because pluralism acknowledges the equal validity of
diverse perspectives, it is an inclusive ideology. As noted above, criticism of
pluralism can come from two nearly opposite directions. One criticism is that
pluralism as an ideology is inherently relativist, and threatens to dangerously
fragment any system and undermine any structure because it does not provide a
system for ranking values or perspectives. It resists "standards," because
112 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986).
113 See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626; Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.
1991); supra notes 70-80, 93-96 and accompanying text.
114 The legislative history shows that discrimination based on sex was included in the
Title VII prohibitions at the last minute, and the amendment was arguably offered as a joke.
See 110 CONG. REc. H2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). However,
arguments that no legislative intent existed for passing remedial legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination lose their force when viewed in fight of subsequent case law recognizing
gender discrimination, and in light of the 1991 Civil Rights Act which similarly prohibited
gender discrimination.
115 TRIBE, supra note 97, §§ 15-21.
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standards by definition marginalize, and thus exclude certain perspectives from
protection or validation. Thus, to embrace pluralism in a legal standard is to
threaten to deconstruct the legal system into a nonstructure with no means of
evaluating varying perspectives with regard to an issue or event.
There is, then, an inherent tension present in the creation of a "pluralistic
standard," since the two concepts ("pluralism" and "standard") defy one
another. Because of this tension, a "pluralistic standard" is not only vulnerable
to criticism because of its relativist aspect, but conversely, it may be criticised
for its normative aspect. In other words, no "standard" can be truly pluralistic,
because to create a standard is to incorporate a normative component that is by
definition exclusive of perspectives outside a particular range. I will briefly
address both criticisms of a "pluralistic standard," and conclude that while each
is valid, neither offers a more attractive alternative, and neither is sufficient to
justify abandoning the reasonable woman or reasonable victim standard.
1. The Deconstniction Criticism
As noted above, the deconstruction criticism in its most elementary form
suggests that injection of a multitude of diverse perspectives into legal
standards threatens to undercut the notion that the law should have abstract
continuity and general applicability. 116 Because there is an enormous body of
legal and social scholarship surrounding deconstruction, I will limit my
discussion to what a rejection of the reasonable woman standard based on a
deconstructionist criticism would mean, and suggest that such a rejection is
inconsistent with shared understandings about justice and the law.
The Rabidue dissent and the Ellison majority opinions provided informed
and articulate discussions of the societal realities facing women employees in
contemporary America. 117 If one accepts the data and information relied upon
in these opinions, it follows that there is a difference in the way members of
different groups (in those cases, women and men) experience and respond to
negative and degrading representations of women and behavior toward women.
A court accepting this premise has two options as it fashions a standard for
evaluating hostile environment claims: it can incorporate the perspective of the
victim into the standard and risk fragmentation of the law, or it can refuse to
incorporate the perspective of the victim, thereby preserving the uniformity of
the legal standard but denying the legal validity of the victim's perspective.
116 See, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, ON DEcoNsTRucrioN: THEORY AND CRrrIcIsM
AFTER STRUCrURALISM (1982); FRANK LENTRIccmA, AFrER THE NEW CRITICISM (1980).117 See supra notes 70-78 and 92-103 and accompanying text.
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Although the specter of a hopelessly fragmented legal system can be a powerful
incentive to maintain coherence in the law, to do so by the means of either
intellectual dishonesty (by denying that there is a difference in perspectives) or
normative tyranny (by saying that there is a difference, but that the law will not
recognize it) seems even more alarming than a system with diminished abstract
continuity. For these reasons, a challenge to the reasonable woman or
reasonable victim standard on deconstruction grounds must fail so long as
society and the courts recognize that a difference in perspectives exists among
different groups in society.
2. Nonnative Standards as Underinclusive
As discussed earlier, one criticism of a "pluralistic standard" is that by
introducing a normative element, the "pluralism" is necessarily diminished
because the standard marginalizes and excludes some perspectives. In her
article, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law,118 Nancy S. Ehrenreich presents the argument that a
"reasonable woman" standard, or any standard including a "reasonableness"
element, ultimately fails as a pluralist mechanism because the normative
character cuts against the recognition of diversity. 119 Ehrenreich, like the
majority in Ellison and the dissent in Rabidue, questions the appropriateness of
a reasonable person standard, asking, "why, for example, in the context of
antidiscrimination statutes designed to reform society, is a standard that is
explicitly tied to the status quo thought to be a proper vehicle for identifying
discriminatory behavior?" 120 Ehrenreich levels the same criticism at the
reasonable woman standard, however, arguing that the "reasonableness"
element ties the standard to racial, class, and other perceived norms among
women, and asserting that "to the extent that a reasonable woman standard fails
to draw the court's attention to issues of race and class, it may perpetrate
existing inequities based on those factors in the same way the reasonable person
standard does when it fails to consider women's point of view." 121 Ehrenreich
asserts that normative standards of any kind directly conflict with the absolute
tolerance for diversity that pluralism demands. She argues that new
formulations Qike the reasonable woman standard) of old constructs (like the
118 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
119 Id.
120 Id.121 Id. at 1218.
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reasonable person standard) "will still merely reinforce and legitimate an
unequal status quo" if the standards are presented as neutral. 122
Ehrenriech, dissatisfied with any normative standard, suggests as an
alternative that "pluralism and tolerance for diversity should be viewed as part
of an expanded commitment to the true sharing of social power." 123 She also
calls for more expansive thinking about "the redistribution of power" 124 and
the "hard choices-and losses-that true distribution would entail." 125
VI. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the broad reading of Title VII is plausible when one
considers the statute as a remedial measure not intended to function as a
mechanism for maintaining the status quo regarding sex discrimination, but
instead intended to facilitate real change. The reasonable woman or reasonable
victim standard is unlikely to be effectively challenged as inconsistent with the
intended function of Title VII, especially in light of Congress' passage of the
1991 Civil Rights Act.
The deconstruction criticism also fails to justify abandoning the reasonable
woman or reasonable victim standard once one acknowledges that significant
differences in perspectives exist among groups. To abandon a more pluralistic
standard and deny members of diverse groups legal protection in order to
preserve legal uniformity and general applicability seems fundamentally
unacceptable. Also, to suggest that the differences among groups are so many
and so profound that they threaten to break the system apart is to fail to
recognize the many cultural and political ideals that we share, and which have a
cohesive effect.
Ehrenreich's call for redistribution is attractive, yet she offers no practical
guidance for how to effectuate such goals. Furthermore, her full-blown
rejection of the reasonable woman standard on grounds that it falls short as a
standard of inclusion is both premature and inconsistent with democratic
jurisprudence and politics. Decisionmaking in a democracy, including judicial
decisionmaking, is evaluated in terms of the integrity of the process, not in
terms of the absolute propriety of the result. Intellectual honesty and open
discussion of any decision may lead to adjustment and improvement of the
result over time, and a decision which falls short of its stated goals does not
122 Id. at 1231.
123 Id. at 1232.
124 Id. at 1232-33.
125 Id.
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necessarily fail. It may be merely undeveloped. As long as the rationale
presented for a decision is relatively honest, it will inform the debate on the
issue and allow for further input and change.
Although it is far from perfect as a mechanism for recognizing and giving
legal validity to diverse perspectives, the reasonable woman or reasonable
victim standard recognizes more diversity than the reasonable person standard
and strives to be inclusive of diverse perspectives. The adoption of the
reasonable woman standard has also served to provoke debate on the issue of
appropriate standards in sexual harassment cases. In light of these
contributions, the adoption of the reasonable woman standard signals a step
toward a more pluralistic standard and possibly a stage in the development of a
more truly pluralistic legal system, and therefore should be retained.
Lynn Dennison
